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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Implantable medical devices have a considerable 
effect on the health and finances of Americans.  The 
United States consumes about half of the worldwide 
market for implantable medical devices.1  Every year, 
surgeons perform approximately seven million procedures 
implanting devices from eye lenses to hip replacements, 
with each procedure ranging in price from $800 to 
$45,000.2  Publicly traded device manufacturers alone 
generate nearly $200 billion in revenue per year, with most 
of the revenue being produced by just thirty companies.3 
The rate of success of the implantation of the medical 
device depends upon device design and physician 
experience.  New devices are often associated with an 
increased rate of complications during the first few years 
the device is on the market as doctors learn how to better 
implant the device and as device companies make 
 
        * The author thanks Professor Rob Leflar, Professor Amanda Hurst, Michael 
Goswami, and Micah Goodwin for their feedback and assistance with this article.  The 
author is an orthopedic surgeon. 
1.  INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 173 (2011) [hereinafter IOM REPORT], 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13150/medical-devices-and-the-publics-health-the-fda-
510k-clearance [https://perma.cc/78VZ-UX7B]. 
2.  Douglas A. McIntyre, The Eleven Most Implanted Medical Devices in 
America, 24/7 WALL ST. (July 18, 2011), http://247wallst.com/healthcare-
economy/2011/07/18/the-eleven-most-implanted-medical-devices-in-america/print/ 
[https://perma.cc/FWC8-RM5D]. 
3.  Id.; see also IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 169-70 (noting revenues of 
almost $190 billion in 2008).   
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modifications to the device.4  On a graph depicting 
complication rates of devices, a distinct elevation can be 
seen during this initial phase as the device is being 
introduced for public use.  This phenomenon is known as 
the “learning curve”5  and is shown for a hypothetical 
implant in Figure 1.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  See, e.g., Aaron J. Johnson et al., Is There a New Learning Curve with 
Transition to a New Resurfacing System?, 69 BULL. N.Y.U. HOSP. JOINT DISEASES 
S16, S16 (2011) (noting a “substantial learning curve” when surgeons first 
switched to hip resurfacing implants from other procedures); Brahmajee K. 
Nallamothu et al., Operator Experience and Carotid Stenting Outcomes in 
Medicare Beneficiaries, 306 JAMA 1338, 1342 (2011) (finding higher mortality 
rates associated with early operator experience); Mikko Peltola et al., Learning 
Curve for New Technology? A Nationwide Register-Based Study of 46,363 Total 
Knee Arthroplasties, 95 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 2097, 2102 (2013) (finding a 
learning curve effect and early revision risks in knee implants, and further 
suggesting that the manufacturers consider the learning effect when designing 
new implants); Aartik Sarma, The Learning Curve for Medical Devices: Experience 
with Vascular Closure Devices in Massachusetts, 61 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOL. 10_S 
(2013) (finding the rate and magnitude of the learning curve differed between two 
different vascular closure devices); Kesavapillai Subramonian, Acquiring Surgical 
Skills: A Comparative Study of Open Versus Laparoscopic Surgery, 45 EUR. 
UROLOGY 346 (2004) (finding differences in the learning curve for open versus 
laparoscopic surgery). 
5.  See Brian Aros et al., Is a Sliding Hip Screw or IM Nail the Preferred 
Implant for Intertrochanteric Fracture Fixation?, 466 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & 
RELATED RES. 2827, 2830 (2008). 
6.  The learning curve is defined as “[t]he time taken and/or the number of 
procedures an average surgeon needs to be able to perform a procedure 
independently with a reasonable outcome.”  K. Subramonian & G. Muir, The 
‘Learning Curve’ in Surgery: What Is It, How Do We Measure It and Can We 
Influence It?, 93 BJU INT’L 1173, 1173 (2004). 
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For medical devices, the learning curve refers to 
the early period of device adoption when the device 
company and surgeons are developing the knowledge 
needed to implant the device reliably in a manner that 
minimizes the risk of harm to the patient.7  Many medical 
devices exhibit learning curves associated with serious 
complications—including death in some cases.8 
During the learning curve period, the complication 
rate for the new device is often higher than for the 
established device being replaced.9  In those instances, 
patients suffer unnecessary complications because the 
doctor could have used the established device to avoid the 
added risk.  Figure 210 demonstrates this scenario where 
the older device is much safer during the learning curve 
period: 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  See id. 
8.  Nallamothu et al., supra note 4, at 1342. 
9.  See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.  
10.  See Subramonian & Muir, supra note 6, at 1174 (“The slope of a learning 
curve depends on the nature of the procedure.  It has been postulated that the 
learning curve for minimally invasive procedures is longer than that for open 
surgical procedures.”). 
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For the hypothetical implant in Figure 2, note that the 
complication rate was higher for the new device from 1998 
through 2005.11  The expertise of subspecialty surgeons, 
who were early adopters of the new device, may have 
elicited lower complication rates for the first couple of 
years (1998-1999 in Fig. 2).  This was followed by higher 
complication rates as the more average surgeons adopted 
the device (2000-2001 in Fig. 2).12  In some cases, a new 
device may be so broadly adopted that it becomes the 
standard of care at the peak of the learning curve even 
though its complication rate is substantially higher than the 
replaced device.  This is likely due to a rush by surgeons 
to adopt the latest and greatest technology.13  Finally in 
2006, in the hypothetical implant example depicted in 
Figure 2, after surgeon self-education and implant 
company modifications to the new device, the 
complication rate for the new device eventually equaled 
that of the established device.14  In reality, after the 
learning curve is complete, the complication rate for the 
new device could remain higher than, equal to, or, ideally, 
lower than the established device. 
 
11.  See Subramonian & Muir, supra notes 6, 9 and accompanying text. 
12.  See id. 
13.  Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of 
Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice: A Review of the 
American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery Database, 90 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 
AM. 700, 706 (2008).  
14.  See supra Figure 2. 
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One device that demonstrated a substantial 
learning curve was a special type of intramedullary nail 
(Nail) used to treat hip fractures.  Around 1997, the Nail 
began to replace an older device known as the 
compression hip screw (Screw).15  Figure 3 depicts the 
Nail’s learning curve for the bone fractures resulting from 
complications16 (e.g., an additional fracture that occurred 
during or after the device was implanted to treat a broken 
hip) and is taken from an article comparing the results of 
the Nail to the Screw.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 318 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For a copy of the graph, please contact the Managing Editor of the Arkansas 
Law Review at arkansaslawreview@gmail.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
(Reprinted with permission of The Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery) 
 
 
15.  Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 705. 
16.  Id. at 704. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of 
Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice: A Review of the 
American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery Database, 90 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM., 
no. 4. 700, 704 (2008).  Graph reprinted with permission. 
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The bars on the right of each pair demonstrate the rate of 
bone fracture for the Nail, and the bars on the left of each 
pair demonstrate the rate of bone fracture for the Screw.19  
From 1999 through 2004, the Nail had a substantially 
higher risk of causing bone fracture than the Screw, 
forming a clear learning curve similar to that depicted in 
Figure 2.20  Finally in 2005, the risk of bone fracture with 
the Nail was similar to the risk associated with the 
Screw.21 
When the results of the two devices are compared, 
implantation of the Nail placed patients at an increased 
risk of bone fracture from 1999 through 2005, which 
coincides with the learning curve for the Nail.22  Several of 
those patients suffered unnecessary bone fracture—a 
serious injury.23  Given the thirty-eight percent death rate 
among elderly patients with such bone fractures (i.e., 
femur fractures) and that the average age of the 
Nail/Screw patients was 77.9,24 it is likely some patients 
died due to the Nail’s learning curve.25  In addition, the 
financial costs associated with adoption of the Nail were 
likely significant considering that hip fractures of the type 
treated with the Nail and the Screw are a “major source of 
morbidity and financial burden” in the United States.26 
Risk-utility balancing can be used to determine 
whether or not the manufacturer (or surgeon) acted 
negligently by releasing (or using) the device with a 
learning curve.27  For a risk to be acceptable, there must 
be enough benefit associated with the device to more than 
 
19.  Id. 
20.  See id. 
21.  Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 704. 
22.  See id. 
23.  See id. at 704-05. 
24.  Philipp N. Streubel et al., Mortality After Distal Femur Fractures in Elderly 
Patients, 469 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 1188, 1190 (2011).  The 
thirty-eight percent death rate is at a maximum follow up of 9.8 years.  Id.  
25.  Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 705. 
26.  Eric Swart et al., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Fixation Options for 
Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures, 96 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 1612, 1612 
(2014) (stating hip fractures account for seven percent of osteoporotic fractures 
and approximately $6 billion annually). 
27.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
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offset the risks of the learning curve.28  In the case of the 
Nail, recent studies have failed to demonstrate any clear 
benefit to individual patients, or to society as a whole, 
when the Nail replaced the Screw for the vast majority of 
hip fracture patients.29  In fact, a research committee 
within the American Board of Orthopedic Surgeons 
(ABOS) concluded that “the consensus from the 
orthopaedic literature is that . . . nail fixation is associated 
with a higher complication rate and no better outcomes”30 
when directly compared to the Screw, noting that the Nail 
was associated with “higher implant costs and surgeon 
fees.”31 
It is inherently unreasonable for patients to be 
subjected to a learning curve for a device that promises 
worse and more expensive outcomes than an established 
device.  Under simple risk-benefit analysis for both the 
individual patient and society as a whole, where an 
unreliably-screened, implantable, medical device 
(USIMD)32 offers no proven benefit, no additional risk over 
 
28.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f.  
29.  Swart et al., supra note 24, at 1618. 
30.  Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 705. 
31.  Id. at 706. 
32.  For the purposes of this paper, an unreliably-screened, implantable, 
medical device (USIMD) is one that reached the market without undergoing 
reliable premarket screening of safety and effectiveness by the FDA.  In 2011, the 
Institute of Medicine concluded that the FDA’s 510(k) screening process (which 
uses “substantial equivalence” as the standard for clearance) “lacks the legal basis 
to be a reliable premarket screen of the safety and effectiveness of moderate-risk 
devices.”  IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.  Therefore, for purposes of this paper, 
the phrase “unreliably-screened” applies to any device cleared through the 510(k) 
process or any other FDA path using “substantial equivalence” as the standard.  
USIMDs for this article are specifically limited to those that are susceptible to state 
law defective design claims because their FDA approval is based upon substantial 
equivalency, and thus, are not subject to federal pre-emption afforded Class III 
devices approved through the Premarket Approval (PMA) process of the Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976.  See Gregory J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, 
Express Preemption and Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device 
Amendments, 59 Food & Drug L.J. 245, 246-55 (2004) (explaining common law 
claims were not expressly preempted “when the device was cleared under the 
[less stringent section 501(k)] process.”).  But see Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig. 
Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 930, 933 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding state law claims alleging 
defective design of devices cleared by federal PMA process are preempted by 
Medical Device Amendment).  “The § 510(k) notification process is by no means 
comparable to the PMA process . . . . [T]he § 510(k) review is completed in an 
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an established device should be accepted.  Patients 
injured during the learning curve for a USIMD have at 
least two potential routes to recovery under current law: 
(1) defective design under products liability law, and (2) 
informed consent doctrine under medical malpractice 
law.33 
II.  PRODUCT LIABILITY: DEFECTIVE DESIGN34 
A learning curve for a USIMD35 associated with 
significant patient injury is prima facie evidence of a 
defective design because the risks of the learning curve 
are not offset by any proven benefit.36  This results from 
the fact the USIMD “lacks the legal basis” of any “reliable 
premarket screen of its safety and effectiveness.”37  The 
World Health Organization (WHO) noted that a slow 
learning curve resulting in poor performance is indicative 
of a poorly-designed device.38  Federal law does not 
preempt state-law defective design claims against 
manufacturers of USIMDs.39 
A plaintiff that can demonstrate the presence of a 
learning curve for a USIMD has a prima facie case for 
defective design, and the burden shifts to the device 
manufacturer to prove that the USIMD’s benefits outweigh 
 
average of only 20 hours” whereas “1200 hours [is] necessary to complete a PMA 
review.”  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1996). 
33.  See Theodore R. LeBlang, Informed Consent and Disclosure in the 
Physician-Patient Relationship: Expanding Obligations for Physicians in the United 
States, 14 MED. & L. 429, 429-30 (1995) (noting that a doctor’s duty to inform a 
patient of material information in regards to medical care and treatment is 
heightened where innovative techniques or research activities are involved); see 
also Mary Beth Neraas, Medical Device Preemption After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 619, 623 (1996) (noting that defective design claim could be 
brought for devices cleared under 510(k) process). 
34.  This section addresses state tort law, not FDA standards.   
35.  See supra note 30. 
36.  See Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 71 (1st Cir. 
2002).  
37.  IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
38.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., MEDICAL DEVICES: MANAGING THE MISMATCH: 
INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND CONSEQUENCES FOR 
TRAINING AND OUTCOME OF CARE 7 (2010) [hereinafter WHO PAPER], 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2010/WHO_ HSS_EHT_DIM_10.4_eng.pdf. 
39.  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 492-94 (holding that devices cleared through § 
510(k) process are subject to state suit for defective design). 
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its risks.40  Absent such proof, the injured plaintiff should 
prevail in a lawsuit against the manufacturer of a USIMD 
with a learning curve.  A failure-to-warn claim is likely to be 
unsuccessful for plaintiffs against device manufacturers 
due to the affirmative defense in some jurisdictions 
provided by the Learned Intermediary Doctrine—except in 
cases where the device manufacturer failed to properly 
warn the surgeon.41 
A. “Learning Curve” as a Prima Facie Case of 
Defective Design 
By definition, a product is “defective in design when 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably 
safe.”42 
Many states hold the seller liable for products using the 
“unreasonably dangerous” standard in contrast to the “not 
reasonably safe” standard.43 
1. Foreseeable Risks 
The risks associated with a USIMD’s learning curve 
are foreseeable where the medical literature documents 
 
40.  Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (shifting burden 
to defendant to prove device was not defective based on risk-benefit theory); see 
supra note 33-34 and accompanying text. 
41.  See Phelps v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 299-303 (7th Cir. 
1987) (applying the learned intermediary doctrine to medical devices and stating 
that the doctor has the duty to warn patient—not the device manufacturer); see 
also Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that 
the manufacturer does not have a duty to warn the patient after adequately 
notifying the physician of risks). 
42.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (emphasis added). 
43.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
(“Unreasonably dangerous” is defined as “dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the 
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”); see Voss 
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that the “not 
reasonably safe” standard is the test to be applied in defective design cases); see 
also Horst v. Deere & Co., 752 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (applying the 
“unreasonably dangerous” standard to products liability law). 
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numerous implants with learning curves,44 where the 
device manufacturer is an expert in the field with 
knowledge of such medical literature,45 and/or where the 
experts writing the literature are often agents of the device 
companies.46  The risks must be foreseeable for a product 
to be defective such that “[o]nce the plaintiff establishes 
that the product was put to a reasonably foreseeable use, 
physical risks of injury are generally known or reasonably 
knowable by experts in the field.  It is not unfair to charge 
a manufacturer with knowledge of such generally known 
or knowable risks.”47 
Medical device manufacturers are required to be as 
knowledgeable as experts in the field for which they create 
devices.48  The expert surgeons and scientists who author 
medical literature acknowledging the presence of learning 
curves are often paid consultants for the manufacturer of 
the USIMDs.49  Therefore, as agents of their principal 
manufacturer, their knowledge can be properly imputed to 
the device manufacturer.50 
2. Reasonable Alternative Design 
A product is defective if the risk of harm could have 
been reduced by adopting a reasonable alternative design 
 
44.  See supra note 4. 
45.  Huggins v. Stryker Corp., 932 F. Supp. 2d 972, 987-88 (D. Minn. 2013). 
46.  See id. at 987-990; see also Mustafa H. Kahn et al., The Surgeon as a 
Consultant for Medical Device Manufacturers: What Do Our Patients Think?, 32 
SPINE 2616, 2617 (2007) (discussing the role of orthopedic surgeons as 
consultants for device manufacturers). 
47.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (emphasis added). 
48.  See Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 215, 222 
(1923) (“The general rule is that a principal is charged with the knowledge of the 
agent acquired by the agent in the course of the principal’s business.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 271 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 1998); A. G. S., Annotation, Duty 
of Manufacturer or Seller to Warn of Latent Dangers Incident to Article as a Class, 
as Distinguished from Duty with Respect to Defects in Particular Article, 86 A.L.R. 
947, 949 (1933). 
49.  See Kahn et al., supra note 44, at 2616-17. 
50.  See, e.g., Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co., 262 U.S. at 224 (finding that 
knowledge was still imputed to the principal despite adverse interests between 
agent and principal). 
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and “the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe.”51  The established device 
with the lower complication rate that forms the floor of a 
USIMD’s learning curve (Figure 2) is an obvious 
reasonable alternative design since it is used for the same 
type of injury with a lower baseline complication rate.52  
Therefore, the Screw is a reasonable alternative design to 
the Nail.53 
The risk-utility test will always find the established 
device a more favorable alternative regardless of whether 
it considers risk-utility from the standpoint of the individual 
patient at risk of direct harm of the USIMD or the 
standpoint of society who will be responsible for the 
expenses resulting from USIMD complications. The 
USIMD by definition has no proven safety and 
effectiveness benefit over the established device and, 
therefore, the established device will be considered the 
reasonable, alternative design wherever risk-utility 
balancing is required.54 
Some states explicitly require proof of a 
reasonable, alternative design, while others do not.55  
Whether a state requires the reasonable, alternative 
design may depend upon how it applies risk utility 
balancing principles.  Some states use the “Consumer 
 
51.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b). 
52.  See Genie Indus., Inc. v. Matak, 462 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2015); see also 
supra Figure 2. 
53.  Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 705; Swart et al., supra note 24, at 
1618. 
54.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
55.  See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1) (2016) (codifying the 
requirement of plaintiff to prove “[t]here existed an alternative design for the 
product that was capable of preventing the claimant’s damage”); Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1189 (Ala. 1985) (requiring that reasonable 
alternative design be shown); Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (requiring a reasonable alternative design).  But see French 
v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that the requirement 
of a reasonable alternative design is not necessary under Arkansas law); Lee v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Okla. 1984) (stating that the 
ordinary consumer expectations of unreasonably dangerous be used instead of 
proof of a reasonable alternative design).   
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Expectations Test”56 which requires that the device sold 
“must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would 
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer.”57  In a 
USIMD case, a jury could find that the ordinary consumer 
would reasonably expect the medical device to be reliably 
screened for safety and efficacy.58  An ordinary consumer 
might also reasonably expect that the device would not be 
marketed to supplant an established device where there is 
knowledge of a harmful learning curve and no reliable 
evidence that the USIMD is superior to the established 
device.  Therefore, in any jurisdiction, the reasonable 
alternative design requirement should be easily met when 
the USIMD with a proven learning curve is being used in 
place of an established device. 
3. Not Reasonably Safe 
USIMDs with learning curves are not reasonably 
safe where they expose patients to increased risks of 
harm without any proven benefit to offset that risk.59  To 
be defective, the jury must determine that the USIMD is 
not reasonably safe.60  The language for this requirement 
varies between states and includes phrases like “not 
reasonably safe,” “unreasonably dangerous” or “fails to 
meet reasonable consumer expectations.”61  The 
reasonable, alternative design concept typically becomes 
relevant in proving whether a device is not reasonably 
 
56.  Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: 
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 861, 901 (1983). 
57.  Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978).  
“[T]he injured plaintiff must prove the product is dangerous and that it was 
unreasonable for such a danger to exist.  Proof of unreasonableness involves a 
balancing process.  On one side of the scale is the utility of the product and on the 
other is the risk of its use.”  Id. at 835.  See also Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 
542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (noting that “the cost and feasibility of eliminating 
or minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case”). 
58.  See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Products Liability in Connection 
with Prosthesis or Other Product Designed to be Surgically Implanted in Patient’s 
Body, 1 A.L.R.4th 921 (1980) (citing Hopkins v. Dow Corning, Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 
(9th Cir. 1994)). 
59.  Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 398 (Pa. 2014). 
60.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1998).   
61.  Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102(7)(A) (West 2006). 
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safe where many states require proof that it was 
technologically (and in some states, economically) feasible 
to produce the product in a safer manner.62  In cases 
where a USIMD replaces an established device, the 
established device already proves both technologic and 
economic feasibility. 
Reasonableness with regard to negligence claims 
is often evaluated by using risk-utility balancing where the 
risks and benefits are compared, as memorialized by 
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co.63  Professor John Wade has identified seven factors 
that have been used by many jurisdictions in performing 
risk-utility evaluations.64  Risk-utility balancing with Wade’s 
factors makes it apparent that USIMDs’ learning curves 
are not reasonably safe because Wade’s factors reveal 
the lack of adequate benefit to offset the associated risks.  
This is true both for the individual patient and for society 
as a whole. 
First, a USMID with a proven learning curve fails to 
satisfy the test of Wade’s first factor, “usefulness and 
desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the 
public as a whole.”65  “Utility to the individual user” 
 
62.  See Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y.1983).  The 
court imposed the requirement of a reasonable alternative design stating that “[t]he 
plaintiff, of course, is under an obligation to present evidence that the product, as 
designed, was not reasonably safe because there was substantial likelihood of 
harm and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner.”  Id. at 208. 
63.  159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
64.  John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 
MISS. L.J. 825, 837–38 (1973).  Professor Wade’s factors have been adopted by 
many jurisdictions.  See, e.g., LaBelle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 508, 
515 n.4 (D.S.C. 2001); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879–80 (Ariz. 
1985); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184 n.10 (Colo. 1992); Potter v. 
Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 n.10 (Conn. 1997); Tabieros v. 
Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1309 (Haw. 1997); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 
475 A.2d 1243, 1251-52 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Nunnally v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 869 So. 2d 373, 379–80 (Miss. 2004); Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 
660 S.W.2d 404, 411–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 
607 A.2d 637, 642–43 (N.J. 1992); Duran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779, 784 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 128–29 (Or. 1974); 
Phatak v. United Chair Co., 756 A.2d 690, 694 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
65.  Wade, supra note 62, at 837. 
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requires a proven benefit over an established device,66 
and utility to the public as a whole requires either a lower 
cost or another benefit to society.67  A USIMD offers no 
proven benefit, only theoretical advantages that have often 
failed to pan out with prior generations of comparable 
USIMDs.68  In fact, USIMDs are often found to be worse 
than the device they replaced resulting in harm to the 
patient at a more expensive price.69  Where a device 
produces equal or worse outcomes for the individual 
patient and is more expensive to the payer system in 
terms of cost of the individual cases plus complications—
there is simply no benefit to offset the risks of the learning 
curve.  Therefore, the first factor heavily favors declaring 
these USIMDs not reasonably safe. 
Second, USIMDs with learning curves fail to pass 
Wade’s second test which involves assessment of the 
“safety aspects of the product,” including the likelihood of 
resulting injury and the seriousness of any injury because 
USIMD injuries are often serious and occur without 
underlying reliable safety testing.70  Significant patient 
injuries are often associated with USIMD learning 
curves.71  Complications from implantable medical device 
procedures may be serious causing further surgeries, 
disability, and/or death.  The company’s decision to forego 
reliable safety and effectiveness screening results in a 
lack of information upon which to base reliable benefit 
assessments of the USIMD.  Instead, safety and efficacy 
testing is basically completed during the learning curve 
period which is perilously close to human 
experimentation—and is, at an absolute minimum, 
 
66.  See Shetterly v. Crown Controls Corp., 719 F. Supp. 385, 399 (W.D. Pa. 
1989) (noting the utility to the individual user, from the use of the pallet trucks, as 
increased productivity and monetary savings).  
67.  See id. (noting the utility to the public as lower grocery prices). 
68.  Marc J. Nieuwenhuijse et al., Appraisal of Evidence Base for Introduction 
of New Implants in Hip and Knee Replacement: A Systematic Review of Five 
Widely Used Device Technologies, 349 BMJ g5133, at 5 (2014) (finding “no 
clinically relevant improved benefits for these devices compared with older and 
established alternative implants”); see also Swart et al., supra note 24, at 1613. 
69.  Nieuwenhuijse et al., supra note 67. 
70.  Wade, supra note 62, at 837. 
71.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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unreasonable where patients’ lives and livelihoods are 
placed at risk unnecessarily due to the learning curve. 
Wade’s third factor is the “availability of a substitute 
product” to meet the “same need and not be as unsafe.”72  
USIMDs with learning curves will fail the third factor.  The 
majority of USIMDs are released with a goal of replacing 
some other device that is already serving the same need 
and has a proven track record.73  If the proven track 
record of the established device is poor or if there is no 
established device, then the hurdle for the USIMD is low.74  
But if the established device has a satisfactory track 
record, the USIMD should offer some type of benefit 
before subjecting patients to the increased risks.  For 
learning curve USIMDs that replace an established device, 
unless the USIMD has evidence to support that it is safer 
than the established device, analysis of USIMDs using 
Wade’s third factor also leads to the conclusion that use of 
the USIMD is not reasonably safe. 
USIMDs with learning curves also fail Wade’s fourth 
factor, which evaluates whether the manufacturer can 
eliminate the device’s unsafe character without making it 
too expensive to maintain its utility.75  The manufacturer 
has a duty to determine whether or not the device has an 
unsafe character.76  A manufacturer cannot assess the 
expenses involved in eliminating learning curve risks 
unless reliable premarket screening is first performed to 
identify those risks.  Further, where no utility or benefit 
over an established device has been scientifically proven, 
 
72.  Wade, supra note 62, at 837. 
73.  See Nieuwenhuijse et al., supra note 67 (finding that several recently 
introduced devices were not safer nor were they more effective than established 
devices). 
74.  See, e.g., Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1053 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Sansom v. Crown Equip. Corp., 880 F. Supp. 2d 648, 663 (W.D. Pa. 2012). 
75.  Wade, supra note 62, at 837. 
76.  Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp, 33 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 1994).  The 
court found that punitive damages were justified where the manufacturer, in a rush 
to develop and market implants, “failed to adequately test the implants” and 
ignored knowledge of adverse health consequences associated with implants 
where “no research concerning the long-term health effects [of product] had been 
conducted.”  Id. at 1119.  Furthermore, the manufacturer “knew long-term studies 
of implants’ safety were needed . . . .”  Id. at 1127. 
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there is no utility to maintain since the user can simply use 
the established device instead. 
Wade’s fifth factor—“the user’s ability to avoid 
danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product”—
may or may not be met depending upon whether the user 
referred to by Wade is the surgeon or the patient.77  If the 
user is the surgeon, then the USIMD fails this factor 
because the surgeon is unlikely to be able to circumvent 
the learning curve since the learning curve phenomenon 
occurs in spite of the surgeon’s extensive training and 
care in implanting a new USIMD.78  An argument may be 
made that USIMDs are “unavoidably unsafe” products,79 
but this argument fails where an established device 
already has a safe track record since the danger can be 
avoided simply by using the established device instead. 
If the user is the patient, the patient should be 
informed of the learning curve in order to have the 
opportunity to avoid the danger.  The manufacturer may 
claim that it has no duty to inform the patient under the 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine and that it is up to the 
surgeon to obtain informed consent.80  To eliminate the 
manufacturer’s duty to the patient, the manufacturer must 
properly inform the learned intermediary (surgeon) that the 
USIMD has not been reliably tested for safety and 
efficacy.81  Arguably, the manufacturer may also be 
required to inform the surgeon that the USIMD has not 
been proven to be superior to the established device, or at 
least, not mislead the surgeon into believing otherwise.82 
Once the surgeon is properly informed by the 
manufacturer, the surgeon then has a duty under the 
Informed Consent Doctrine to properly apprise the patient 
 
77.  Wade, supra note 62, at 837. 
78.  Phelps v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(debating whether surgeon should be considered a user of medical device); see 
also Cutshall v. Photo Medic Equip., Inc., No. CIV.A.1:CV98-297, 2000 WL 
1028548, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2000) (stating that Wade’s fifth factor refers to 
the user as the ordinary consumer). 
79.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
80.  See infra Section II.C. 
81.  Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 26 (1998). 
82.  See id. at 34-35; Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 
(8th Cir. 1970). 
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of the risks so that the patient can make an informed 
decision about his or her own health care when choosing 
between the unproven promise of the USIMD and the 
established device.83  Where the implant company has 
failed to notify the surgeon of the USIMD’s approval path 
and lack of safety and efficacy testing, such knowledge 
cannot be imputed to the surgeon where the surgeon is 
not an expert in implant design and the approval 
process—so the responsibility still lies with the 
manufacturer.84  Without disclosure, the surgeon may not 
have the opportunity to properly inform the patient and 
avoid the danger of the learning curve where the 
manufacturer’s marketing materials promote advantages 
that the surgeon may reasonably assume have a solid 
scientific basis.  Likewise, the surgeon and patient may 
have reasonably assumed that safety and efficacy testing 
are a part of the approval process. 
Wade’s sixth factor is “[t]he user’s anticipated 
awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their 
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the 
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of 
suitable warnings or instructions.”85  USIMDs with learning 
curves fail Wade’s sixth factor because there is little public 
knowledge of the learning curve and its associated 
dangers for new USIMDs.  Presumably much of the public 
(including physicians) assumes safety and efficacy testing 
is a required part of the approval process by the FDA.  
However, it is unlikely that the public or physicians are 
generally aware of shortcuts such as the “substantial 
equivalence” test.86 
 
83.  See Kowalski v. Rose Drugs of Dardanelle, Inc., 2011 Ark. 44, at 17, 378 
S.W.3d 109, 120 (stating physicians are in the best position to inform patients of 
risks of treatment). 
84.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998). 
85.  Wade, supra note 62, at 837. 
86.  See Nicholas Bakalar, Medical Procedures May Be Useless, or Worse, 
N.Y. TIMES: WELL (July 26, 2013, 2:30 PM), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/medical-procedures-may-be-useless-or-
worse [https://perma.cc/3U7R-FEKV] (“We usually assume that new medical 
procedures and drugs are adopted because they are better.”). 
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Wade’s final factor is “[t]he feasibility, on the part of 
the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the 
price of the product or carrying liability insurance.”87  The 
medical device industry is very profitable making it feasible 
for the manufacturer to carry liability insurance.  Where a 
small percentage of users suffer unnecessary 
complications during the learning curve period of a 
theoretically advantageous new USIMD, it is not 
unreasonable to require the device manufacturer to 
spread the loss sustained by those individuals to all users 
of the device and to the manufacturer themselves by 
either purchasing liability insurance or by self-insuring.  
The device manufacturer can eliminate its liability by 
conducting reliable safety and efficacy testing or by 
undergoing the Premarket Approval process, which may 
result in federal preemption.88 
Thus, Wade’s risk-utility analysis clarifies that a USIMD 
with a learning curve is not reasonably safe if it causes 
significant patient injuries. 
B. Burden Shift: The Device Manufacturer Should Be 
Required to Prove Benefit Once the Plaintiff 
Establishes “Learning Curve” Risks 
After proving a USIMD is associated with a learning 
curve, a plaintiff will have made a prima facie case of 
defective design because the plaintiff will have shown 
foreseeability of risk, reasonable alternative design, and a 
presumptive risk-utility balance that supports a finding of 
lack of reasonable safety.89  If the patient can demonstrate 
with expert testimony that his or her physician was on the 
learning curve, then the burden shifts to the device 
manufacturer to demonstrate benefits to offset the risks 
associated with the learning curve because the 
manufacturer has the means and the motivation to prove 
that its devices are beneficial, if such proof can be found.90  
 
87.  Wade, supra note 62, at 838. 
88.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (2012); see Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 477, 503 (1996). 
89.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
90.  See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978). 
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It is unreasonable to require a plaintiff to prove 
Defectiveness by scientific standards where the 
manufacturer has never shown Effectiveness.  Once the 
manufacturer has presented its case for benefit versus the 
plaintiff’s case for risk, the question becomes one of fact 
for the jury to consider in light of risk-utility balancing 
considerations. 
The manufacturer is in the best position to prove 
the benefits of its implants.  The USIMD manufacturer has 
access to:  the means to manufacture and alter the device; 
the designing surgeons who are implanting and evaluating 
the device; and patient follow-up information during the 
product development period.  This makes it feasible for the 
company to monitor the outcomes of early patients and 
encourage their affiliated surgeons to produce research 
proving safety, efficacy, and beneficial use.  Research will 
benefit the company’s financial bottom line if it can prove 
that a device is effective.  The company can then market 
those findings to other surgeons.  Thus, the device 
manufacturer has the means and the motivating factors to 
provide proof of beneficial use and effectiveness, if such 
proof exists.  If reliable established devices are available 
and the company cannot prove beneficial use of the 
USIMD, then no learning curve risk should be tolerated 
based on simple risk-to-benefit analysis. 
Conversely, a plaintiff patient—with access only to 
clinical studies outside information available from the 
manufacturer through discovery—would not be able to 
produce reliable scientific studies proving defectiveness.  
The plaintiff is unlikely to have the means to secure expert 
testimony adverse to wealthy manufacturers from implant 
designers who hope to continue to work in this $200 billion 
per year industry.91  This generally leaves hired guns as 
the only feasible alternatives to testify on behalf of the 
plaintiff,92 and at a very high financial cost and limited 
 
91.  See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 169-70; see also McIntyre, supra note 
2. 
92.  See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How 
Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1126-30 
(1997).  
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credibility under Daubert standards.93  From a practical 
standpoint for the plaintiff, the barriers imposed by 
Daubert are usually insurmountable for learning curve 
USIMDs due to the costs involved and the limited ability of 
anyone outside the industry to produce such devices and 
test them in patient care circumstances. 
Therefore, the plaintiff should only be required to 
put forth Daubert-level evidence proving that the risks 
outweigh the benefits, if the device manufacturer can 
scientifically prove sufficient benefit.  If the device 
manufacturer is unable to prove any benefit over an 
established device that is safe, then the plaintiff should 
prevail when he/she was injured during a learning curve. 
C. Other Design Defect Considerations: Failure to 
Warn and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Device manufacturers may be liable for defective 
design for failure to warn of the harms associated with the 
learning curve for USIMDs, but the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine’s affirmative defense makes this approach 
difficult for the plaintiff. 
[A product] is defective because of inadequate 
instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable 
instructions or warnings by the seller or other 
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial 
chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
instructions or warnings renders the product not 
reasonably safe.94 
However, in some states, the device manufacturer 
may assert an affirmative defense under the Learned 
 
93.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Daubert 
places limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence by applying a reliability 
standard that requires that testimony be grounded in scientific methods and 
procedures.  Id. at 592-93.  The judge is to consider whether the theory can be 
tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, whether it 
has a known error rate, whether standards control its operation and whether it is 
widely accepted in the scientific community.  Id. at 593-94.  The focus is on the 
principles and methodology.  Id. at 595. 
94.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
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Intermediary Doctrine that it reasonably relied upon the 
physician to convey relevant warnings to the patient.95  In 
the vast majority of medical implant cases, the device 
manufacturer has no direct contact with the plaintiff prior to 
the surgical procedure, and imposing a duty on the 
manufacturer to intervene in the doctor-patient relationship 
is generally disfavored.96  Therefore, the Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine would apply to most medical device 
cases. 
On the other hand, the plaintiff may still have an 
argument for failure to warn because the device 
manufacturer has a duty to warn the surgeon of the 
product’s dangerous propensities and may have failed to 
do so.97  To assert the Learned Intermediary defense as a 
shield against liability, the device company for the USIMD 
must provide adequate warnings to the prescribing 
surgeon.98  Some courts have ruled that the patient is 
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of proximate 
causation where the manufacturer failed to adequately 
warn the learned intermediary.99  Also, if the salespeople 
working for the manufacturer are guilty of over-promotion, 
the warning may be deemed inadequate.100  Norms within 
the medical profession may make surgeons susceptible to 
an overreliance on misleading information leading to a 
belief that they are engaging in sound medical practice 
 
95.  See Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying 
Arkansas law); Kane, supra note 80, at 73-74 (1998 & Supp. 2016) (noting that 
courts in fourteen states allowed the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to relieve the 
manufacturer of the duty to warn the patient directly). 
96.  West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 42, 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (1991); 
Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138, 155 (Haw. 1995); see Kane, supra note 80, at 73-
77 (1998 & Supp. 2016). 
97.  See Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 42 (Ill. 2002). 
98.  Breen v. Synthes-Stratec, Inc., 947 A.2d 383, 387 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); 
McNichols v. Johnson & Johnson, 461 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (noting 
that under Illinois law, the learned intermediary doctrine is a shield against liability 
only where the manufacturer of a prescription drug has given adequate warning of 
known dangerous propensities of the drug to physicians); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
99.  Mampe v. Ayerst Labs., 548 A.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Miller v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1126 (D. Kan. 2002); Woulfe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
965 F. Supp. 1478, 1483 (E.D. Okla. 1997). 
100.  Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1973); Hamilton 
v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1109 (Colo. App. 1976); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 
206, 219 (Pa. 1971). 
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where medical device manufacturers influence surgeons 
in ways similar to pharmaceutical firms.101  Device 
manufacturers generally do not disclose to surgeons that 
USIMDs reached the market using “unreliable screening,” 
and many surgeons assume otherwise.102 
Physicians who have limited experience using a 
new device are not in the best position to recognize the 
presence of a learning curve because the subtle 
differences between implants are not always readily 
apparent.  A device manufacturer that properly introduces 
and monitors a new medical device is in a much better 
position to recognize the presence of a learning curve, 
while a single surgeon has only his or her own experience 
to draw from.  Thus, it would be proper to hold the 
manufacturer liable for failure to warn the surgeon of any 
learning curve risks. 
III.  MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INFORMED 
CONSENT 
A violation of the standard of reasonable conduct103 
under the Informed Consent Doctrine occurs when a 
surgeon fails to inform a preoperative patient of his or her 
learning curve with a particular USIMD.104  The learning 
curve risks of some USIMDs are within the required scope 
of disclosure of material facts to the patient for informed 
consent as a matter of public policy.  In addition, the 
Affordable Care Act’s “preference sensitive care” 
 
101.  Marc A. Rodwin, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical Policy, 
41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 544, 548-49 (2013). 
102.  From my 20 years working as an orthopaedic surgeon, I do not recall 
any device company representative ever disclosing that a device was cleared via a 
“substantial equivalence” pathway, and I generally assumed that available devices 
on the open market had undergone testing with scientific rigor similar to publication 
standards in our industry—minimum of 2 years clinical follow-up with rigorous 
clinical evaluation.  Likewise, I have heard other surgeons make similar 
assumptions throughout my career.   
103.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 356 
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (“In other words, ‘duty’ is a question of 
whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular 
plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the same—to conform to the 
legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”). 
104.  See Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease 
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 370 (1975). 
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provisions may provide an added layer of obligation to 
disclose the learning curve for elective procedures.105 
A. Public Policy 
Physicians have a fundamental duty to warn 
patients of the risks and consequences of a medical 
procedure under the Informed Consent Doctrine.106  Under 
the doctrine, the patient’s right to participate in the 
decision-making process regarding his or her personal 
health is regarded as one of the patient’s “most 
fundamental rights.”107  Informed consent is important for 
many reasons, including preservation of personal 
autonomy and the right of self-determination.108  It fosters 
communication between doctor and patient, encouraging 
doctors to be careful in decision-making while 
simultaneously fostering rational decision-making by the 
patient and involving the public in medical decision-
making.109  Patient outcomes may improve if patients are 
assisted in making informed decisions about their own 
treatments and illnesses.110  By participating in and 
understanding the process, patients can also improve 
quality of care by giving feedback to the healthcare 
system.111  Some doctors feel that physician inexperience 
is not part of the informed consent equation.112  The idea 
that a physician may not disclose his or her inexperience 
to the patient in order to gain experience to help future 
patients has been described as the “physician’s dodge” 
with one author saying, “[l]earning must be stolen, taken 
as a kind of bodily eminent domain.”113 
 
105.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 936, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-
36(b)(2), (d)(1)(A) (2012). 
106.  Lucas v. Awaad, 830 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). 
107.  Yves Longtin et al., Patient Participation: Current Knowledge and 
Applicability to Patient Safety, 85 MAYO CLINICAL PROC. 53, 54 (2010).  
108.  Capron, supra note 104, at 365. 
109.  Id. at 365-76. 
110.  BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LAW AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY, PATIENT 
SAFETY, AND MEDICAL LIABILITY 185 (7th ed. 2013). 
111.  Longtin et al., supra note 107, at 53.   
112.  Ashley H. Wiltbank, Note, Informed Consent and Physician 
Inexperience: A Prescription for Liability?, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 573 (2006). 
113.  ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT 
SCIENCE 32 (2002). 
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Failure to inform the patient of a USIMD’s learning 
curve deprives the patient and the system of all of the 
benefits of informed consent doctrine.  First, the patient’s 
fundamental rights of self-determination and personal 
autonomy are violated where the surgeon is allowed to 
choose a riskier USIMD over an established device 
without disclosing the risks involved with the learning 
curve, and allowing the patient to participate in the choice.  
Second, failure to reveal the learning curve to the patient 
deprives the patient of the opportunity to make a rational 
choice between competing devices.  Third, an opportunity 
is missed to personalize the learning curve by 
encouraging the surgeon to reflect upon the 
consequences of the learning curve upon the individual 
patient.  Finally, from a public policy standpoint, failure to 
inform the patient leaves the patient uneducated and 
unable to provide necessary feedback during the learning 
curve period for USIMDs.  Informing the patient of the 
learning curve allows the patient to participate more 
vociferously during this phase of device implementation.  
Thus, an opportunity to gain a patient’s assistance in the 
assessment of quality of care is missed if the patient is 
uninformed. 
 
 
 
 
B. Scope of Disclosure 
The scope of information that should be disclosed 
under the Informed Consent Doctrine clearly includes the 
risks associated with a learning curve where the courts 
have required that surgeons inform patients of material 
risks, alternative treatment options, and risks of death or 
serious injury.114  Whether the physician had a duty to 
warn of dangers associated with particular circumstances 
is generally a question to be submitted to the jury.115 
 
114.  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
115.  Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1960). 
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Many courts adopt a rule that any material risk must 
be disclosed.116  “A material risk is a risk which a 
reasonable person would consider significant in deciding 
whether to undergo a particular medical treatment.”117  
The risks of a learning curve for a USIMD are often 
material risks.118  A reasonable person would likely 
consider a learning curve significant in his or her decision 
to undergo surgery with a USIMD if that learning curve 
increases significantly the risk of the procedure over an 
established device.  For example, at least one court has 
considered failure of a surgeon to disclose his 
inexperience with a particular procedure as admissible 
evidence for the jury to consider in an informed consent 
evaluation.119  Where the risk involves serious injury like a 
bone fracture for the Nail used in the case illustration 
discussed earlier, a reasonable person would probably 
consider that information significant in making the 
decision. 
Many courts require the surgeon disclose 
reasonable alternative treatment options.120  A reasonable 
 
116.  See, e.g., Hill v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., 933 A.2d 314, 329-30 
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Hahn v. Mirda, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (Ct. App. 2007); DeGennaro v. Tandon, 
873 A.2d 191, 196 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 118 
F. Supp. 2d 73, 81 (D. Mass. 2000). 
117.  Hill, 933 A.2d at 330. 
118.  P. Healey & J. Samanta, When Does the ‘Learning Curve’ of Innovative 
Interventions Become Questionable Practice?, 36 EUR. J. VASCULAR & 
ENDOVASCULAR SURGERY 253, 256 (2008).  
119.  Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1255 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding “a 
number of courts have concluded physician-specific information such as 
experience is relevant to the informed consent issue and physicians have a duty to 
voluntarily disclose such information prior to obtaining a patient’s consent”); 
Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1170, 1172 (Del. 1997) (noting that failure to 
disclose that physician had not recently performed aneurism surgery and there 
were other nearby hospitals that specialized in aneurism surgery were important 
considerations for informed consent); Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 
N.W.2d 495, 506 (Wis. 1996) (“[T]he defendant was not unduly or unfairly 
prejudiced by the admission of evidence reflecting his failure to disclose his limited 
prior experience in operating on basilar bifurcation aneurysms.”). 
120.  See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., 895 P.2d 484, 493 (Alaska 1995); Miller 
v. Van Newkirk, 628 P.2d 143, 146 (Colo. App. 1980); Ray ex rel. Ray v. Kapiolani 
Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d 569, 581 (Haw. 2011); Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 
88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958); Stanley v. Chevathanarat, 664 S.E.2d 146, 149 
(W. Va. 2008). 
780            TROUBLE WITH THE CURVE [Vol.  69:755 
rule is that “where a physician or surgeon can ascertain in 
advance of an operation, alternative situations and no 
immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed 
of the alternative possibilities and given a chance to 
decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation.”121  
Where an established device has a proven track record 
and the new USIMD has merely hypothetical projections, 
the established device would be the reasonable, 
alternative treatment option.  In any jurisdiction that 
requires disclosure of a reasonable, alternative treatment 
option under the Informed Consent Doctrine, the fact that 
the established device is available as a reasonable 
alternative and has not been shown to be inferior to the 
new USIMD is a material fact that must be disclosed.  
Failure to do so subjects the surgeon to potential liability 
for failure to provide informed consent. 
Finally, informed consent almost always requires 
the surgeon disclose risks of death or serious injury.122  
Where a USIMD has a known learning curve with a risk of 
death or serious injury, the physician has a duty to 
disclose those risks.  If the information available to the 
physician is controversial, then the surgeon may simply 
disclose the facts of the information available and leave 
the decision to the patient.123 
 
 
 
 
C. Standard of Care 
Whether the jurisdiction requires surgeons to follow 
the reasonable patient standard or the reasonable doctor 
standard, disclosure of the learning curve risks of the 
 
121.  Bang, 88 N.W.2d at 190. 
122.  Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787-88; Ray, 259 P.3d at 584; Mitchell v. 
Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (noting the physician must warn of “possible serious 
collateral hazards”).   
123.  Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87. 
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USIMD is required.124  The states are evenly divided on 
which standard is applied.125 
In states that use the reasonable patient standard, 
the doctor breaches his or her duty of informed consent 
where a reasonably prudent patient with the plaintiff’s 
characteristics would have declined the operation with the 
USIMD if he or she had been properly informed.126  
Because a reasonably prudent patient would want to be 
informed of the learning curve and its risks as well as 
reasonable alternative methods of treatment (e.g., the 
established device), a surgeon who has failed to disclose 
risks and alternatives can be found to have breached his 
or her duty.  A few jurisdictions replace the reasonably 
prudent patient (objective standard) with the particular 
plaintiff (subjective standard)127 so that the duty is to 
disclose information that the particular plaintiff would 
consider important.  In those jurisdictions, the plaintiff can 
easily claim that he or she would have wanted to know 
about the learning curve and would have chosen the safer 
alternative if given the choice. 
A reasonably prudent patient would want to know of 
an increased risk of death or serious injury associated with 
a learning curve.  Likewise, if the doctor is on the learning 
curve because of limited experience with a new USIMD, a 
reasonable patient would probably want to know that 
information.  In addition, if there are less risky alternatives, 
the reasonable patient would likely want to know of the 
alternative and participate in any decision to accept the 
added risk of a USIMD.  All of those factors are material to 
the patient’s ability to make a rational decision in giving 
informed consent. 
In jurisdictions where the reasonable physician 
standard is used, the doctor has a duty to disclose “any 
known risks of death or serious bodily injury”128 and “such 
 
124.  See Healey & Samanta, supra note 118, at 256. 
125.  FURROW ET AL., supra note 110, at 195. 
126.  Giles v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 5 So. 3d 533, 553-54 (Ala. 
2008); Ex parte Mendel, 942 So. 2d 829, 837 (Ala. 2006); Harrold v. Artwohl, 132 
P.3d 276, 280 (Alaska 2006). 
127.  Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Okla. 1979).   
128.  Jones v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 894, 901 (N.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 
127 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that physician has a duty to disclose known 
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additional [risks] as a skilled practitioner of good standing 
would provide under similar circumstances.”129  The 
applicable community standard is a question of fact for the 
jury130 and expert testimony is required to establish the 
standard of care.131  In these jurisdictions, some doctors 
doubtless disclose learning curve risks, including the risks 
and benefits of the new USIMD versus the established 
device as well as the specific doctor’s personal experience 
and preferences.132  Therefore, it may be possible to show 
that the standard of care is to disclose that information via 
expert testimony. 
However, even if the learning curve is not routinely 
disclosed by the surgeons in a reasonable doctor 
jurisdiction, the court can still adopt the rule that disclosure 
of the learning curve is the standard of care.133  Judge 
Learned Hand pointed out that “[w]hat usually is done may 
be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to 
be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence.”134  
Hand notes that “a whole calling may have unduly lagged” 
the adoption of “reasonable prudence,” and in those 
cases, “[c]ourts must . . . say what is required.”135  Hand 
goes on to say that “there are precautions so imperative 
that even their universal disregard will not excuse their 
omission.”136 
 
risks of death or serious bodily injury to the patient and to explain the 
complications that might occur); see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 
1972). 
129.  Jones, 933 F. Supp. at 901-02. 
130.  Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 479, 597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (1980); Stauffer 
v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. App. 1971).   
131.  Mather v. Griffin Hosp., 540 A.2d 666, 670 (Conn. 1988).  
132.  See Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Advisory Opinion on the Code of 
Ethics: Learning New Techniques Following Residency (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.aao.org/ethics-detail/advisory-opinion—learning-new-techniques-
followin#related-comments. 
133.  See Anna C. Mastroianni, Liability, Regulation and Policy in Surgical 
Innovation: The Cutting Edge of Research and Therapy, 16 HEALTH MATRIX J. L. 
MED. 351, 427-28 (2006). 
134.  Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903). 
135.  The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
136.  Id. 
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William L. Prosser137 explained that “in negligence 
cases, the duty is . . . to conform to the legal standard of 
reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”138  
The doctor must satisfy this duty by informing the patient 
of the risk of the learning curve especially where those 
risks are material to the patient’s decision, are 
unnecessary due to an alternative treatment option, or are 
risks of serious injury or death.139  Disclosure of the 
material facts necessary to allow the patient to make 
rational decisions is such a basic right that it might be time 
for courts to overrule the profession in any jurisdiction 
where the disclosure of learning curves is not standard 
practice. 
D. Affordable Care Act: “Preference Sensitive Care” 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides evidence 
of changing professional standards of care for informed 
consent with regard to “preference sensitive care” 140 that 
may be used as evidence in matters of state informed 
consent law.  Preference sensitive care is defined the 
following way: 
[M]edical care for which the clinical evidence does 
not clearly support one treatment option such that 
the appropriate course of treatment depends on the 
values . . . and preferences of the patient . . . 
regarding the benefits, harms and scientific 
evidence for each treatment option, the use of such 
care should depend on the informed patient choice 
among clinically appropriate treatment options.141 
For USIMDs with learning curves, the device 
manufacturers have foregone safety and effectiveness 
testing, and thus, conceivably do not have “clinical 
 
137.  William L. Prosser, a former dean of the University of California Law 
School at Berkeley, was widely considered “a great Master at Torts.”  Lawrence H. 
Eldredge, William Lloyd Prosser, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1245, 1245, 1247 (1972).  
138.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 103. 
139.  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
140.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 936, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-
36(b)(2), (d)(1)(A) (2012). 
141.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 936, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-
36(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
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evidence” to “clearly support” or favor the use of the 
USIMD over an established device.142  In those instances, 
the ACA appears to advocate allowing the patient to hear 
about “each treatment option” and use his or her own 
“values and preferences” in the decision making 
process.143  This cannot be done if the physician fails to 
inform the patient of the learning curve, the risks of the 
USIMD, and the presence of a safe alternative device. 
IV.  OVERARCHING PUBLIC POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Innovation is an important part of the advancement 
of medical science;144 however, newness is not the same 
as innovation.  An advancement should move the field 
forward, not backwards or sideways.145  Arguably, 
surgeons’ adoption of the Nail did not advance the field of 
orthopedic treatment of hip fractures and may have 
actually set it back.  This shift from the Screw to the Nail 
resulted in many patients experiencing unnecessary 
disability and probably some deaths.146  Today, there is 
still no evidence the Nail is better than the Screw it 
replaced.  That is not advancement—that is marketing.  
Where the USIMD is more profitable than the established 
device, it may also be profiteering at the expense of the 
harmed patient.  Therefore, the court system should 
reward the patients who suffered for these innovations by 
recognizing the failures of the device manufacturers and 
the surgeons involved. 
Understanding why surgeons adopt ineffective, 
harmful technology may help provide a solution to the 
problem.  A former president of the American Academy of 
Orthopaedic Surgeons (the “world’s largest medical 
association of musculoskeletal specialists” now with over 
 
142.  See id.  
143.  See id. 
144.  IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 193 (“The committee believes that given 
the broad interpretation of the term it should define innovation not simply as a 
change but as a favorable change in the context of public health . . . . The 
committee defined innovation broadly as improving the quality of, efficiency of, or 
access to health care.”). 
145.  Id. 
146.  Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 704-05. 
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39,000 members worldwide)147 described medicine as a 
“marketing arm of industry.”148  Similarly, a prominent 
medical ethicist noted that “there is no necessary 
correlation between the kind of innovation generated by 
the market and the kind of technology needed to improve 
overall health.”149 
The cost of USIMDs with learning curves is 
substantial.  For example, hip fractures of the type treated 
with the Nail and the Screw are a “major source of 
morbidity and financial burden” in the United States 
accounting for seven percent of osteoporotic fractures and 
approximately $6 billion annually.150  According to a 2008 
study, government insurers like Medicare spent an 
average of $950 more per surgery on the Nail than the 
Screw during the first year after implantation.151  If the Nail 
were used in approximately 150,000 intertrochanteric hip 
fractures in the U.S. each year, the extra cost would have 
been around 142.5 million (i.e., 150,000 x $950) per year 
for this single device.152  By 2008 when this study was 
published, the learning curve phenomenon with the Nail 
was largely complete.153  These numbers could very well 
underestimate the actual cost of adopting the Nail 
considering that from 1999 through 2004 the complication 
rate for Nail-related bone fracture alone was between 
300% and 800% that of the Screw.154  If only a small 
percentage of the 48,000 USIMDs cleared from 1996 
through 2009 had the same financial impact as the Nail 
adoption, then the costs to the U.S. healthcare system 
would be staggering.155 
 
147.  American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Background, AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, 
http://www.aaos.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=1604.   
148.  AUGUSTO SARMIENTO, BARE BONES: A SURGEON’S TALE: THE PRICE OF 
SUCCESS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 284 (2003).  
149.  DANIEL CALLAHAN, FALSE HOPES: WHY AMERICA’S QUEST FOR PERFECT 
HEALTH IS A RECIPE FOR FAILURE 225 (1998). 
150.  Swart et al., supra note 24, at 1612. 
151.  Aros et al., supra note 3, at 2831. 
152.  See id.; see also Swart et al., supra note 24, at 1612. 
153.  See Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 704 (Figure 4-A). 
154.  See id. at 703-04. 
155.  IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 136.  
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Regulation of high-risk devices released through 
pathways intended for lower risk devices is a great 
challenge.156  In 2010, there was public outcry over 
several specific devices and the methods through which 
the FDA cleared them.157  Calls for change to the FDA’s 
approval process for implantable medical devices have 
been emphatic and have come from highly respected 
authorities, yet Congress has still failed to act.158  In 2011, 
the FDA asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to review 
the 510(k) clearance process and make recommendations 
to protect the health of the public while protecting the 
legitimate interests of industry.159  The IOM concluded that 
the 510(k) process was fatally “flawed”160 because it 
generally does not evaluate safety and efficacy and 
cannot be transformed into such process.161  The IOM 
noted that the assessment utilized (“substantial 
equivalence”) does not provide a “reasonable assurance 
of safety and efficacy” as required by statute for some of 
the devices at issue (Class III).162  The IOM Committee 
 
156.  Daniel B. Kramer et al., Regulation of Medical Devices in the United 
States and European Union, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 848, 852 (2012). 
157.  Gardiner Harris, U.S. Inaction Lets Look-Alike Tubes Kill Patients, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/21/health/policy/21tubes.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0 [https://perma.cc/Q3ZX-XLCU] (noting resistance from the medical device 
industry and an approval process that discourages safety-related changes as 
factors in deaths related to some tubing connections); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. 
Vows to Revoke Approval of Device, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/health/policy/15fda.html 
[https://perma.cc/3CSU-FJAS] (noting politics trumped science in approval of knee 
patch); Barry Meier, The Implants Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/business/17hip.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/5BHK-8QFZ] (recognizing potential problems with several 
devices that had been cleared through the 510(k) process, including an artificial 
hip); Alicia Mundy & Jared A. Favole, F.D.A. Rips Approval of Medical Device, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125382260933538517 [https://perma.cc/FM6Z-
BXVB] (noting Congressional pressure damaged the integrity of the F.D.A.’s 
approval process). 
158.  IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 n.5 (noting that concern is being 
raised about the 510(k) process not fostering innovation nor making safe and 
effective devices available to patients citing letters from House Representatives). 
159.  IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at xi. 
160.  Id. at 3. 
161.  Id. at 5.   
162.  Id. 
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recommended that the FDA scrap the current system and 
replace it with an “integrated premarket and postmarket 
regulatory framework that effectively provides a 
reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness 
throughout the device life cycle.”163  Obviously, the life-
cycle would include the learning curve period.  However, 
there are no signs that such changes are forthcoming, and 
implant manufacturers continue to argue for more lenient 
standards.164 
This leaves the court system as the patient’s best 
protector against unreasonable harm, or death, at the 
hands of medical device manufacturers and overly-eager, 
early-adapter surgeons who promote USIMDs.  Where it 
can be proven a device has a learning curve by showing 
that the surgeon has not done many procedures with the 
device, and the literature or experts agree that a learning 
curve is expected, the patient injured during the learning 
curve has a valid argument for defective design.  When 
the patient is uninformed, he or she may also have claims 
for failure to warn (if the manufacturer did not inform the 
surgeon) or for lack of informed consent against the 
doctor. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The presence of a learning curve with significant 
patient injuries for a USIMD is prima facie evidence of 
defective design, and unless the device manufacturer can 
demonstrate a benefit to offset the risk, the patient should 
prevail in a design defect case where the patient was 
harmed by the device implanted by a surgeon on the 
learning curve.  Risk-utility balancing in close cases 
should be left to the trier of fact.  When the patient is not 
warned about the presence of the learning curve with a 
USIMD, the patient may have a claim against the 
manufacturer for failure to warn if the learned intermediary 
was not properly informed of the risk, or against the 
 
163.  Id. at 8. 
164.  Dangerous Medical Implants and Devices: Most Medical Implants Have 
Never Been Tested for Safety, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 2012), 
http://consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/04/cr-investigates-dangerous-
medical-devices/index.htm [https://perma.cc/P7PH-MBFJ]. 
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physician for lack of informed consent if the surgeon fails 
to notify the patient of the risks of the learning curve.  As it 
is, there are overarching public policy concerns that 
support the courts taking up this issue to protect the 
interests of patients and of society as a whole. 
 
